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ETUITY
REFORM
Under the New Uniform Act
by Lawrence W. Waggoner
The following article is adapted from an article soon to be
published in the Cambridge Law Journal.
As this article was going to press, the Uniform Act was
enacted in Nevada and South Carolina .

T

he wait-and-see version of perpetuity reform
- adopted a few years ago by the American
Law Institute as part of the Restatement
(Second) of Property (Donative Transfers)
(1983)- gained another champion when, last summer, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities (Uniform Act or USRAP).
Among a number of unique features of the Uniform
Act, the method used to delimit the waiting period deserves special notice. The waiting period is the period
of time allotted for the contingencies attached to an
otherwise invalid property interest to work out harmlessly. In a step believed to be unprecedented, the
waiting period adopted by the Uniform Act is a flat
period of 90 years.
The 90-year period represents a reasonable approximation of- a proxy for - the period of time that
would, on average, be produced by the traditional
method of identifying and tracing a set of actual
measuring lives and then tacking on a 21-year period
following the death of the survivor. The 90-year period
was derived from the assumption that the youngest
measuring life, the one likely to live the longest, would

usually determine the length of the waiting period,
were actual measuring lives to be used. A statistical
study, prepared by the reporter as part of the USRAP
Drafting Committee's work, suggests that the youngest measuring life, on average, would be about 6 years
old. Government statistics indicate that the remaining
life expectancy of a 6-year old is between 69 and 70
years. In the interest of arriving at an end number that
is a multiple of five, the Uniform Act utilizes 69 years
as an appropriate measure of the remaining life expectancy of a 6-year old, which-with the 21-year
tack-on period added - yields a waiting period of 90
years.
The traditional assumption, followed in the Restatement (Second) and previous wait-and-see statutes, is
that the waiting period must be delimited by reference
to measuring lives, so that the waiting period expires
21 years after the death of the last surviving measuring
life. Rather than calling into question the necessity or
desirability of using measuring lives, the controversy
has centered on who the measuring lives should be
and how the law should identify them. Two basic
methods of identifying measuring lives have been
advanced: (i) the statutory-list method (used in the
Restatement (Second) §1.3, the English Perpetuities &
Accumulations Act 1964, §3, and the statutes of a few
other common-law jurisdictions) and (ii) the causalrelationship method (used in Kentucky Rev. Stat.
§381.216 and the statutes of a few other common-law
jurisdictions).
Intrinsic to the actual-measuring-lives approach,
however, are identification and tracing problems. If
the statutory-list method is used, the measuring lives
are difficult to describe in statutory language that is
both uncomplicated and unambiguous. The statutory
language necessary to adopt the causal-relationship
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method is not so difficult to draft as it is to apply to
actual cases. No matter how the measuring lives are
identified, the lives of actual individuals must be
traced so as to determine which one is the survivor
and when he or she died.
The tracing and identification problems are exacerbated by the fact that it seems to be accepted under
both methods that the measuring lives cannot be a
static group, assembled once and for always at the beginning. Instead, individuals who were once measuring lives must be dropped from the group on the
happening of certain events (such as the individual's
divorce, adoption out of the family, or assignment of
his or her beneficial interest to another) and, conversely, individuals who were not among the initial
group of measuring lives must be allowed to join that
group later, if certain events happen (such as marriage, adoption into the family, or receipt of another's
beneficial interest by assignment or succession) and
if they were living when the interest in question was
created. The proxy method eliminates the problems of
identifying and tracing a rotating group of measuring
lives so intrinsic to the actual-measuring-lives
approach. The expiration of a waiting period measured
by a flat period of 90 years is easy to determine and
unmistakable.

T

he USRAP Drafting Committee considered
possible grounds for resisting the replacement of the actual-measuring-lives approach,
despite the gain in administrative simplicity
that would result from adopting a flat period of years.
One such ground was the idea that the use of actual
measuring lives - especially if determined by the
causal-relationship method - generates a waiting period that self-adjusts to each situation, somehow extending the dead hand no further than necessary in
each case. A flat period of years obviously cannot replicate a self-adjusting function. The concern proved to
be unfounded, however: A little inspection revealed
that this is not the function performed by the actualmeasuring-lives approach. Although that approach
produces waiting periods of different lengths from one
case to another, the use of actual measuring lives does
not generate a waiting period that expires at a natural
or logical stopping point along the continuum of each
disposition, thereby pinpointing the time before which
actual vesting ought to be allowed and beyond which
it ought not to be permitted. Instead, the actualmeasuring-liyes approach - whether the measuring
lives are determined by statutory list or causalrelationship formula - functions in a rather different
way: It generates a period of time that almost always
exceeds the time of actual vesting in cases in which
actual vesting ought to be permitted. The actualmeasuring-lives approach, therefore, performs a
margin-of-safety function, which is a function that
can be replicated by the use of a proxy such as the flat
90-year period under the Uniform Act.
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The following examples briefly demonstrate the
margin-of-safety function of the actual-measuringlives approach:
Example (1) - Corpus to Grandchildren Contingent on
Reaching an Age in Excess of 21. G died, bequeathing
property in trust, income in equal shares to G's children for the life of the survivor, then in equal shares to
G's grandchildren, remainder in corpus to G's grandchildren who reach age 30; if none reaches 30, to a
specified charity.
Example (2) - Corpus to Descendants Contingent on Surviving Last Living Grandchild. G died, bequeathing property in trust, income in equal shares to G's children for
the life of the survivor, then in equal shares to G's
grandchildren for the life of the survivor, and on the
death of G's last living grandchild, corpus to G's descendants then living, per stirpes; if none, to a specified charity.
In both examples, assume that G's family is typical,
with two children, four grandchildren, eight greatgrandchildren, and so on. Assume further that one or
more of the grandchildren are living at G's death, but
that one or more are conceived and born thereafter.
All of the grandchildren living at G's death were then
under the age of 30.

As is typical of cases that violate the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities and to which wait-and-see
applies, these dispositions contain two revealing features: (i) they include beneficiaries born after the trusts
were created, and (ii) in the normal course of events,
the final vesting of the interests will coincide with the
death of the youngest of these after-born beneficiaries
(as in Example (2)) or with some event occurring during the lifetime of that youngest after-born beneficiary
(such as reaching a certain age in excess of 21, as in
Example (1)).
By tradition, the waiting period is measured by the
lives of individuals who must be in being at the creation
of the interests. In both of the above examples, on the
facts given, the youngest measuring life - the one
likely to live the longest - is G's youngest grandchild
in being at G's death. That grandchild, it should be
noted, is undoubtedly the youngest mel'tsuring life under either the statutory-list or the causal-relationship
method. The key players in these dispositions, however, are the after-born grandchildren, for the youngest of them is likely to live longer than the youngest
measuring life. Because the after-born grandchildren
are not counted among the measuring lives, the expiration of a waiting period measured in the traditional
fashion cannot be thought to coincide with the latest
point when actual vesting should be allowed - in the
above cases, on the death of the last survivor of G's
grandchildren, the youngest of whom is after-born. It
is the tack-on 21-year part of the waiting period that
almost always extends the period sufficiently so that it
expires at some arbitrary time after that beneficiary's
death and thereby validates the dispositions. In Ex-

ample (2), the period of 21 years following the death of
the last survivor of the grandchildren who were in being at G's death is normally more than sufficient to
cover the death of the last survivor of the grandchildren born after G's death.

T

hus the actual-measuring-lives approach performs a margin-of-safety function. A proxy
for this period performs this function just as
well. In fact, in one respect it performs it more
reliably because, unlike the actual-measuring-lives
approach, the flat 90-year period cannot be cut short
by irrelevant events. The supposition that the tack-on
21-year part of the period is usually ample to cover the
births, lives, and deaths of the after-born beneficiaries
relies on the measuring lives' living out their statistical
life expectancies. They are not guaranteed to live that
long, however. They might all die prematurely, thus
cutting the waiting period short - possibly too short
to cover these post-creation events. Plainly, no rational
connection exists between the premature deaths of the
measuring lives and the time properly allowable, in
Example (1), for the youngest after-born grandchild to
reach 30 or, in Example (2), for the death of that
youngest after-born grandchild to occur. A flat period
eliminates the possibility of a waiting period cut short
by irrelevant events.
Another question raised by a 90-year waiting period
is whether it authorizes excessive dead-hand control.
Any concern that it does must be put in a proper perspective: First, the Uniform Act does not authorize an
increase in aggregate dead-hand control beyond that
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which is already possible under the full rigor of the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities by the common practice of utilizing perpetuity saving clauses. In
fact, it now seems to be agreed that the waiting period
under wait-and-see operates much like a perpetuity
saving clause. Dispositions such as those in Examples
(1) and (2) are routinely created and are validated by
such clauses. No demonstrated harm seems to have
befallen society as a result - even though the period
of time generated by a perpetuity saving clause can
easily exceed 90 years, as can the period of time generated by a waiting period measured by actual measuring lives plus 21 years, whether the causal-relationship
or statutory-list method is used. Second, the fact that
the waiting period under the wait-and-see element of
the Uniform Act is 90 years does not mean that vesting
in all trusts or other property arrangements will be
postponed for the full 90 years, or even come close to
being postponed for that long. As with a perpetuity
saving clause, final vesting in most trusts or other
property arrangements will occur far earlier, so that
the perpetuity-period component of the clause or its
near equivalent, the 90-year waiting period under
the Uniform Act, extends unused into the future long
after the interests have vested and the trust or other
arrangement has been distributed. If excessive deadhand control is a problem, then, it is not the Uniform
Act that is or would be the root cause, but the
common-law Rule itself, especially the feature of the
common-law Rule that allows the use of perpetuity
saving clauses to validate otherwise invalid interests
such as those in Examples (1) and (2), above.
For all of the above reasons, which are elaborated
in greater detail in an article on the Uniform Act published in 21 Real Property, Probate & TrustJ. 569
(1987), the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Act
came to believe that a flat 90-year waiting period is to
be preferred over the other approaches: Without authorizing dead-hand control beyond that which is
routinely invoked by competent drafting, the 90-year
waiting period performs the same margin-of-safety
function as the actual-measuring-lives approach, performs it more reliably, and performs it with a remarkable ease in administration, certainty in result, and
absence of complexity as compared with the uncertainty and clumsiness of identifying and tracing
actual measuring lives.
Adopting a flat period of 90 years rather than using
actual measuring lives is an evolutionary step in the
refinement of the wait-and-see doctrine. Far from
revolutionary, it is well within the tradition of that doctrine. The 90-year period makes wait-and-see simple,
fair, and workable. Having been endorsed by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
the Board of Regents of the American College of Probate Counsel, and the Board of Governors of the
American College of Real Estate Lawyers, the Uniform
Act deserves serious consideration for adoption by the
various state legislatures. ~
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